# The Cursor breach: a vendor key, agent traces and a backdoored extension

> How a leaked vendor key, stored AI coding agent traces and a cached extension turned into an SSH backdoor on developer machines, and what to check on yours.

- Published: 2026-11-17
- Topics: AI security, Supply chain, AI coding agents
- Canonical page: https://thesecguy.com/notes/cursor-breach-vendor-key-backdoored-extension/
- Publisher: The Sec Guy (https://thesecguy.com)

**Short answer:** Cursor says an attacker used an access key exposed by its vendor Fireworks AI to copy a shared bucket of old coding agent traces, some holding credentials that had escaped redaction. A second stolen credential let the attacker plant tampered copies of the Claude Code extension (2.1.312 and 2.1.313) in Cursor's extension cache on 29 October, which at most 5,000 users may have received. Anything you type into an AI coding agent can end up stored somewhere, so keep secrets out of agent sessions and treat editor extensions like dependencies.

---

Cursor has traced its October breach to an access key exposed by Fireworks AI, one of its vendors. The attacker used that key to copy stored coding agent traces, found credentials inside them, and used one of those to plant a backdoored copy of the Claude Code extension where Cursor users download extensions.

If you build with AI coding tools, two parts of this story apply to you whatever editor you use. Your agent sessions are data that someone stores, and your editor extensions are code that runs with your access.

Our sources are Cursor's 13 November incident update and published analyses of the extension. We read them as reported by [Cyber Security News](https://cybersecuritynews.com/cursor-data-breach/) and [GBHackers](https://gbhackers.com/cursor-security-breach-exposes-api-credentials/). Cursor's own page would not open for us, so every fact here appears in at least two of their reports. Cursor says the incident is contained.

## What happened

Per Cursor's update, the key gave read-only access to a storage bucket shared with Fireworks. The bucket held coding agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions that ran outside Privacy Mode. Some of those traces contained credentials that had escaped redaction.

A trace is a record of what an agent saw and did in a session: prompts, files, tool output. If a secret passed through the session, it can sit in the trace long after you've forgotten pasting it.

The attacker then used a credential taken from that data to reach Cursor's extension delivery. On 29 October, modified copies of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, were placed in the cache that serves Cursor's extension marketplace. Cursor says at most 5,000 users who asked for those specific cached versions may have received them, during a window of roughly 11 hours. Cyber Security News points out that this is a possible distribution count, not 5,000 confirmed infections.

Anthropic did not publish these packages, and Cursor says Anthropic's product was not vulnerable. Some early reports said the bad package was on Open VSX. Cursor's update says Open VSX never hosted it.

<figure class="fig">
<p class="fig-k">How one vendor key reached developer laptops</p>
<div class="flow">
<div class="node"><b>1. Vendor key</b><span>An access key exposed by Fireworks AI, read-only</span><div class="chips"><i class="chip">third party</i></div></div>
<div class="node"><b>2. Shared bucket</b><span>Old coding agent traces from sessions outside Privacy Mode</span><div class="chips"><i class="chip">stored sessions</i></div></div>
<div class="node"><b>3. Secrets in traces</b><span>Some credentials had escaped redaction</span><div class="chips"><i class="chip">leaked secrets</i></div></div>
<div class="node"><b>4. Extension cache</b><span>Tampered Claude Code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 placed on 29 October</span><div class="chips"><i class="chip">supply chain</i></div></div>
<div class="node"><b>5. Your laptop</b><span>SSH key added, reverse tunnel attempted, env variable names sent out</span><div class="chips"><i class="chip">backdoor</i></div></div>
</div>
<figcaption>Our layout of the chain described in Cursor's 13 November update, as reported by Cyber Security News and GBHackers.</figcaption>
</figure>

## What the tampered extension did

The reports describe a loader added to the extension. On a machine that ran it, the code added an attacker's SSH public key to the user's authorized keys with the label `svc-telemetry`, then tried to open a reverse SSH tunnel to `134.209.82.225`. It also sent out the names of environment variables that looked like credentials. Only the names went out, according to the reports.

The persistence files sit outside the extension's own folder. So uninstalling or updating the extension does not remove them. Cursor's cleanup advice, as reported, goes further than uninstalling for that reason.

There is one piece of luck in the reports: coding errors in the malware and missing administrator rights blocked remote login on most hosts. "Most" still leaves some.

<figure class="fig">
<p class="fig-k">The numbers Cursor gave</p>
<div class="tiles">
<div class="tile hot"><b>≤5,000</b><span>users may have received a tampered build</span><small>possible, not confirmed</small></div>
<div class="tile"><b>~11 h</b><span>window the tampered builds were served</span><small>29 October</small></div>
<div class="tile"><b>&lt;0.05%</b><span>of users had old agent traces exposed</span><small>sessions outside Privacy Mode</small></div>
<div class="tile"><b>&lt;0.01%</b><span>of customers had API credentials exposed</span><small>found inside traces</small></div>
</div>
<figcaption>Source: Cursor's 13 November 2026 update, as reported by Cyber Security News and GBHackers. The figures describe different parts of the incident, so don't add them up.</figcaption>
</figure>

## The timeline

<figure class="fig">
<p class="fig-k">Attacker steps and Cursor's response</p>
<div class="rank">
<div class="rk"><b>1</b><span>Vendor key used to copy the shared trace bucket<small>date not given in the reports</small></span><i class="mv down">attacker</i></div>
<div class="rk"><b>2</b><span>Tampered Claude Code builds placed in the extension cache<small>29 October, about 11 hours</small></span><i class="mv down">attacker</i></div>
<div class="rk"><b>3</b><span>Marketplace taken offline, bad builds removed, service rebuilt<small>after the builds were found</small></span><i class="mv up">response</i></div>
<div class="rk"><b>4</b><span>Last attacker activity seen, and blocked<small>1 November</small></span><i class="mv up">response</i></div>
<div class="rk"><b>5</b><span>Update links the breach to the Fireworks key; incident called contained<small>13 November</small></span><i class="mv same">update</i></div>
</div>
<figcaption>Source: Cursor's statements as reported by Cyber Security News and GBHackers. Red is the attacker, green is the response.</figcaption>
</figure>

Per Cursor, Privacy Mode prompts, customer code repositories and official Cursor app updates were not affected.

## Why builders should care even if they don't use Cursor

The attacker never broke Cursor's front door. They came in through a vendor, and the valuable thing they found was a pile of agent sessions with secrets in them. Most AI coding tools send your context to servers you don't run: the tool maker's, a model provider's, sometimes a training pipeline. Each of those copies is a place a key can leak from.

The second half is an old problem in a new spot. We covered how fast a leaked key gets used in [Leaked an AWS key on GitHub?](https://thesecguy.com/notes/leaked-aws-key-first-5-minutes/), and how agents get steered by what they read in [6 real AI agent hijacks](https://thesecguy.com/notes/prompt-injection-6-real-ai-agent-hijacks/). Here the agent wasn't tricked at all. The attacker swapped the tool itself.

## What to do this week

**If you use Cursor with the Claude Code extension.** Check whether you had version 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 installed around 29 October. Look in `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for a key labeled `svc-telemetry`, and search your network logs for `134.209.82.225`. If you find either, follow Cursor's cleanup notice, isolate the machine, and rotate every credential it could reach from a different, clean device.

**Keep secrets out of agent sessions.** Don't paste keys into prompts. Keep `.env` files and credential folders out of what the agent can read, and use short-lived tokens so a key copied from a trace six months later has already expired. If your tool has a privacy or no-training mode, find out what it changes about storage and turn it on for work code.

**Rotate anything that ever passed through a session.** If you can't say for sure that a key never appeared in an agent chat, treat it as exposed and rotate it.

**Treat editor extensions like dependencies.** Know which marketplace your editor pulls from, pin versions for tools that run with your shell access, and give a brand-new release a day before you install it unless it fixes something you need.

**Ask your AI vendors two questions.** How long do you keep my session traces, and which of your own vendors can read them? This breach started two companies away from the people affected.

## Sources

Checked on 17 November 2026. Cursor's own update, Microsoft's analysis and the Fireworks bulletin would not open for us, so we rely on these reports of them and only use facts that appear in at least two.

- Cyber Security News, [Cursor Reveals How a Leaked Fireworks AI Key Led to a Backdoored Claude Code Extension](https://cybersecuritynews.com/cursor-data-breach/), 14 November 2026.
- GBHackers, [Cursor Security Breach Exposes API Credentials and Source Code Following Fireworks AI Supply Chain Attack](https://gbhackers.com/cursor-security-breach-exposes-api-credentials/), 16 November 2026.
- GBHackers, [Hackers Distribute Malicious Claude Code Extension on Cursor Marketplace to Install Persistent SSH Backdoor](https://gbhackers.com/hackers-distribute-malicious-claude-code-extension/), 31 October 2026: Microsoft's analysis of the backdoor.
- Cyber Security News, [Weaponized Claude Code Extension Gives Hackers Persistent Remote Access to Developer Systems](https://cybersecuritynews.com/malicious-claude-code-extension/), 30 October 2026: the first technical analysis.
