Episode 02 · AI agents · Prompt injection · MCP · AI security
6 Ways Hackers Hijack Your AI Agent
Six real cases where an error log, a contact form, a PDF, a GitHub issue, an email and a browser extension hijacked AI agents, and the five fixes that stop all of them.
Premiering soon
This video goes live on YouTube on Sat 24 Oct, 7:00 pm IST.
An AI agent can’t reliably tell data from instructions. To the model, it’s all just text. So anything the agent reads can carry a hidden command, and the agent runs it with your access. This is called indirect prompt injection.
The six hijacks
- The error log. A fake error report tells a coding agent to run a command on the developer’s machine (“agentjacking”, June 2026).
- The contact form. Hidden text in a web form makes a CRM agent leak customer accounts (SalesBleed, September 2026, patched).
- Invisible text in a PDF. Text a person can’t see, but the AI reads, sends work data to an outside address (Atlassian Rovo, August 2026).
- A GitHub issue. An agent reading a public issue uses your token to publish private code (GitHub MCP, May 2025).
- The email you never opened. Zero clicks: an assistant leaks data through an image link (EchoLeak, June 2025, fixed).
- A browser extension. A malicious extension takes over the AI assistant in your browser (BragJack, September 2026).
The five fixes
- Treat everything a tool returns as untrusted.
- Require human approval before an agent runs commands, sends data or changes anything.
- Give agents short-lived tokens with the least access possible.
- Block the way out: no automatic images or links, and an allow-list of where agents can connect.
- Audit every MCP server and browser extension you plug in.